MANILA 04 March 2026 – Members of the DFA Press Corps,

A pleasant day to all of you. 

Let me begin by making a rejoinder to recent statements that question the Philippines’ incontrovertible and indivisible sovereignty over Bajo de Masinloc.

Bajo de Masinloc, then known as “Panacot”, was portrayed by the Murillo Velarde map published in 1734. Subsequent maps reflected the same information. The Philippines’ then colonial rulers exercised jurisdiction over the feature as evidenced by detailed surveys, official correspondences, and other acts of administration. In fact, the first official survey took place in 1800 and was carried out by the Santa Lucia, a Spanish frigate, on behalf of the Spanish colonial government.

This was further emphasized following the ceding of the Philippines by Spain to the US in the 1898 Treaty of Paris and the 1900 Treaty of Washington. While the Treaty of Paris described the Philippine Islands as comprising all the islands within an irregular polygon, Spain also had sovereignty and jurisdiction over islands and places outside of the lines of that polygon. These islands and places were clarified to have also been transferred to the United States under the terms of the Treaty of Washington.

Following the birth of the Republic of the Philippines, Bajo de Masinloc continued to be subject of Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction. These included the 1963 discovery and disassembly of a smuggler’s base by the Philippine Navy, and the subsequent declaration of the shoal as a target and bombing range of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. All these exercises of sovereignty were uninterrupted and conducted peacefully and openly, without protest from any country until as late as 1997 when NAMRIA conducted a GPS survey of the shoal as part of its effort to identify points to be used to create the archipelagic baseline system under UNCLOS.

The Philippines, through the DFA, has since continued to firmly protest and challenge the illegal assertion of sovereignty by other states over the feature, especially following China’s unlawful actions in 2012 when they illegally took over and occupied Bajo de Masinloc as a response to the Philippines’ lawful arrest of poachers in the area. 

Ladies and gentlemen,

The Department also informs the public that it has held talks with Chinese foreign ministry counterparts in Beijing on 27-28 February 2026. Both sides had an open and candid exchange of views on prevailing bilateral concerns, including in the maritime domain, and explored possible areas of mutually-beneficial cooperation.

These recent meetings are yet another demonstration of the Department’s unwavering commitment to protecting  national interest. This is consistent with the second core dynamic of maritime statecraft – the proactive effort to keep bilateral and regional channels open. This shows our commitment to managing the situation at sea peacefully, further reflected by our mandate to assert and uphold Philippine interests while also seeking common ground where possible.

One good example of the Department’s efforts in this regard is the Provisional Understanding on the Rotation and Resupply Mission to the BRP Sierra Madre. The Provisional Understanding is a set of principles and approaches observed by both sides in order to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation in the conduct of the Philippines’ routine rotation and resupply (RORE) missions to the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin Shoal.

This Provisional Understanding has now facilitated thirteen (13) routine RORE missions since its inception in July 2024. All these missions had no reports of untoward incidents.

Nevertheless, the success of the Provisional Understanding and the safe rotation and reprovisioning of our personnel has been subjected to uninformed criticism, flawed analysis and a narrow understanding of both international law and of national objectives.

Allow us to clearly address the erroneous points that have been raised in the public sphere on the matter.

First, there have been mistaken attempts at equating the Provisional Understanding with Provisional Arrangements under UNCLOS. To be clear, the Provisional Understanding is not nor has ever been a Provisional Arrangement under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS. Rather, it is an understanding between the Philippines and China with the aim of conflict prevention and conflict avoidance, which is well contemplated in international law and not just in UNCLOS. To portray the Provisional Understanding as a singular application of UNCLOS provisions demonstrates either a fundamentally unfounded interpretation of international law, or a malicious attempt to deliberately misconstrue the Philippine position and government efforts.

Second, it is a basic principle of governance and international relations that states have the prerogative to ensure the confidentiality of documents involving matters of great importance, particularly national security and international relations. 

DFA Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro and her team carefully crafted the Provisional Understanding, which was then approved by the highest officials of the Philippine Government, particularly National Security Adviser Eduardo Año.

Indeed, where the country is looking to secure the safety and welfare of Philippine personnel, with the active participation of all national security agencies, the Philippine Government must exercise maximum discipline and focus, with minimum diversion and interference.

Third, we reiterate the clear, firm and enduring position of the Philippines that the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award has definitively settled that UNCLOS already defined the scope of maritime entitlements of the Philippines and China in the South China Sea, and that these entitlements may not extend beyond the limits imposed therein. There are no valid overlapping maritime claims between the Philippines and China in the West Philippine Sea, and the historic rights derived from the so-called “9-dash line” are without legal effect. 

The Provisional Understanding takes full note of the foregoing, and was drafted specifically to be without prejudice to the Philippines’ national position. The Provisional Understanding does not require the Philippines to seek permission to undertake RORE missions, nor does it allow boarding and inspection of Philippine vessels, and, above all, it does not concede the Philippines’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.

Indeed, there is an inherent inconsistency and dullness of reasoning when critics criticize a document that they have not even seen.  

The Philippines will continue to implement the Provisional Understanding as agreed. We expect China to do the same.

The DFA assures the Filipino people that it will firmly and consistently uphold the Philippines’ national interest, and remain vigilant in protecting our sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction. The DFA will continue to use effective diplomacy as the bigger tool in the Philippine government’s toolbox in order to peacefully manage the situation at sea, uphold the welfare of our naval and maritime personnel and artisanal fishermen, and avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation in the conduct of the Philippines’ routine maritime operations in all its maritime zones, including in the West Philippine Sea.

Thank you very much. END